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Abstract 
 
How can one teach what one does not know? Most film depictions of teaching follow a 
satisfying (and it would seem endlessly entertaining) Aristotelian dramatic structure. But 
what if the teacher does not know what she is summoned to teach? And what if there 
were a theory of pedagogy that celebrated a teacher’s ignorance rather than her 
authority (power, position, privilege, pre-established role) or expertise (knowledge, 
experience, judgment)? How or why, in Jacques Rancière’s parlance, an ‘ignorant 
schoolmaster’ may have a talent for teaching – that is, an efficacy and influence on 
student learning that trumps antecedent knowledge – becomes a locus of inquiry in 
these pages. Several of Wes Anderson’s films can be said to include an ignorant 
schoolmaster, or ‘New Master’. Arguably, The Grand Budapest Hotel (2014) features the 
highest achievement of expression of the ignorant schoolmaster in Anderson’s work: M. 
Gustave teaches without knowing, teaches inadvertently as he learns what needs to be 
taught. By way of contrast – that is, as a way of illuminating M. Gustave’s representative 
qualities as an ignorant schoolmaster – I will also consider the character of the 
professional, authoritative, and knowledgeable preparatory school teacher, or ‘Old Master’, 
William Hundert in The Emperor’s Club (2002). 
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How can one teach what one does not 
know? Most film depictions of teaching 
follow a satisfying (and it would seem 
endlessly entertaining) Aristotelian 
dramatic structure: sagacious teacher 
faces ignorant student, teacher 
endeavors to teach student, student 
struggles to understand teacher, and 
finally obstacles are overcome – student 
learns from teacher, and to enhance 
pathos, usually teacher is said to ‘learn 
more’ from student. But what if the 
teacher does not know what she is 
summoned to teach? And what if there 
were a theory of pedagogy that 
celebrated a teacher’s ignorance rather 
than her authority (power, position, 
privilege, pre-established role) or 
expertise (knowledge, experience, 
judgment)? How or why, in Jacques 
Rancière’s parlance, an ‘ignorant 
schoolmaster’ may have a talent for 
teaching – that is, an efficacy and 
influence on student learning that 
trumps antecedent knowledge – 
becomes a locus of inquiry in these 
pages. As will become clear, ‘ignorance’, 
as it is invoked on this occasion, is very 
far from an epithet or a slander: just the 
opposite, ignorance becomes a 
harbinger of a novel mode of teaching; 
and this teaching seems to reveal a 
methodology that itself constitutes a kind 
of content. The ignorant schoolmaster, 
whomever she may be, is a 
transformative – even transgressive –
figure heralding an alternative to 
education as we have known it, and 
believed in it. 
Several of Wes Anderson’s films can be 
said to feature an ‘ignorant 
schoolmaster’ – someone who teaches 
(and who learns) from a place of 
ignorance. Once pointed out, this figure 
seems a leitmotif of nearly all of 
Anderson’s films, but especially 
Rushmore (1998) (which also takes place 
at a school, in the fraught relationships 
between teachers and students), The 
Royal Tenenbaums (2001) (especially in 
the figure of the paterfamilias, Royal, 
whose compromised authority becomes 
a prerequisite for the poignancy and 
efficacy of his wisdom), The Life Aquatic 
with Steve Zissou (2004) (where the 
question of Ned’s paternity becomes the 
condition for Steve to ‘father’ him anew, 
or at last – and then, after Ned’s death, 
to be fathered by him), Moonrise 
Kingdom (2012) (as a couple of youthful 
runaways force a cloistered community 
of parents, police officers, social workers, 
and boy scout leaders to reassess their 
conceptions and implementation of 
knowledge and power over the young –
 and themselves), and more recently in 
The Grand Budapest Hotel (2014) (in 
which concierge M. Gustave H. [Ralph 
Fiennes] is the reluctant mentor of lobby 
boy, Zero Moustafa [Tony Revolori/F. 
Murray Abraham]). Arguably, The Grand 
Budapest Hotel features the highest 
achievement of expression of the 
ignorant schoolmaster in Anderson’s 
work – a first clue to which is that Zero 
begins at zero (a first position, an 
emptiness, a lack) and M. Gustave does 
not impose authority from knowledge 
but from sensibility. This is to say, M. 
Gustave is a figure who is at once 
preoccupied with propriety (the 
normative standards befitting the finest 
hotels, that is, with exemplary service 
and as part of an institution with a 
tradition worthy of upholding), with taste 
(being a man of taste), but also with 
acceptance – or reservation of judgment 
about – human frailty, weakness, 
contradiction, and difference. M. Gustave 
may rant, but he can also (and genuinely) 
recant. He may offer moral 
admonishment to another, such as Zero, 
and yet chastise himself in the next 
breath. By these turns, Mr. Gustave 
exemplifies hallmark traits of the 
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ignorant schoolmaster: for he teaches 
without knowing, teaches inadvertently 
as he learns what needs to be taught. 
For the present essay, I will focus on the 
ways in which Anderson’s The Grand 
Budapest Hotel offers illustrative 
contours for understanding a 
pedagogical theory expressed by 
Jacques Rancière in his The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in 
Intellectual Emancipation. M. Gustave 
seems a compelling incarnation of 
Rancière’s figure who can ‘teach without 
explication’, who can illuminate 
knowledge without prior awareness of it. 
In this respect, Rancière’s 
commendation antagonizes prevailing 
education trends that support the cult of 
the ‘expert’ and cultural habits of 
deferring to the established, 
institutionally credentialed and sanctified 
‘authority in the field’. On this dominant 
model (indeed, old, old account), the 
student is a vessel for imbibing the 
teacher’s accumulated wisdom – as if 
such hard-won insights could be passed 
along this way, as if a student would 
benefit from them without critique or 
question. Moreover, a contemporary 
fixation with scientific assessments of 
‘effectiveness’ has left realms such as the 
humanities scrambling to justify and 
defend ‘learning outcomes’ and explain 
how such learning can be ‘scalable’. 
Neoliberalism has intensified the 
perception of education-as-commodity, 
and in the process made the humanistic 
impulses of learning a liability. The con-
catenation of asymmetrical authority 
(imposed from on high) coupled with a 
quantitative approach to comprehension 
would be funny if it were not dangerous, 
at times harmful, and thus so often, 
tragic. 
With Rancière, however, we discover a 
transgressive critique of the overlapping 
domains of power and knowledge that 
yields instead empowerment prior to 
knowledge. As such, the conditions for 
learning are immanent, ever-present, 
accessible – and, perhaps most un-
cannily, dependent on ignorance. 
Teaching is practiced not as an 
inculcation of knowledge predicated on 
the asymmetry of (higher) teacher and 
(lower) student (by way of explicating the 
text), but instead through a fundamental 
equality before the text – where teacher 
and student stand shoulder to shoulder 
as they read. Rancière’s radical scheme 
for emancipating how we learn – and 
from whom – provides crucial, essential 
lessons for contemporary pedagogical 
theory across disciplines. 
By way of contrast – that is, as a way of 
illuminating M. Gustave’s features as an 
ignorant schoolmaster – I will also 
consider the character of the 
professional, authoritative, and 
knowledgeable preparatory school 
teacher, William Hundert (Kevin Kline) in 
The Emperor’s Club (2002). Hundert, like 
M. Gustave, is poised to educate young 
men – teenagers, in fact. However, the 
similarities between Hundert and 
Gustave fade as we recognize Hundert 
aspiring to the role of sage: a person for 
whom the history of other persons (their 
biographies, their ‘examined lives’) may 
impart lessons for ourselves; the ‘activity 
of the soul’ in accord with virtuous habits 
contributes to one’s character; and the 
‘molding of character’ among his 
students is his self-appointed charge; 
Hundert is very much the model of an 
Aristotelian. And not surprisingly, the 
kinds of students he has – or is it 
creates? – reflect his modeling and his 
presumptions about their status as 
students (as lower, as lesser, as standing 
in need of his instruction). The obedient 
student grows up to be respectful, if 
somewhat milquetoast, whereas the 
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recalcitrant student matures boldly and 
defiantly, and in part by ratifying his 
condescension to Hundert as a ‘beacon 
of virtue’. 
Unlike Zero, who responds favorably to 
M. Gustave’s bumbling, unrehearsed 
remarks on life, service, and personal 
conduct, Hundert’s pupil Sedgewick Bell, 
bridles before and rebels against 
Hundert’s attempts to correct and 
form/reform his behavior. Hundert’s 
idealism and Bell’s incorrigibility (and 
values that stand in stark contrast with 
those of his mentor) are meant to give us 
pause: to make us wonder if Hundert is 
foolish or naïve, or if his pedagogical 
methods are flawed, and how we can 
find our allegiance with Hundert given 
his self-described ‘failure’ as a teacher of 
Bell. And so we come to see that though 
Hundert failed his student, The Emperor’s 
Club itself teaches its audience through 
this illustration of ostensibly failed 
teaching. Despite his defeat with Bell (or 
is it by Bell?), then, we are nevertheless 
persuaded to believe that Hundert 
remains the wise and knowing one – the 
teacher whose deep knowledge of 
human conduct is unmolested, 
unchecked, even as it is incapable of 
being imparted to his pupil. (Even his 
name – Hundert – German for ‘one 
hundred’ evokes the perilous ideal of 
perfection familiar to any student: how 
100% promises a wholeness and 
completeness and rectitude that makes 
anything less feel like a referendum on 
one’s personal value – not just that one 
knows less but that one is worth less). 
Hundert is a great teacher who, it would 
seem, cannot teach; perhaps also of 
relevance, Hundert is a teacher who 
cannot write (he is blocked). This irony –
 of a teacher who cannot teach (for 
example, a teacher who cannot reach all 
of his students, or a teacher who 
succeeds in imparting lessons of soon-
forgotten facts instead of ideas of lasting 
impact) – is something we are meant to 
learn from Hundert (especially through 
his illustrious failure with Bell) and from 
the film’s framing of this pedagogical 
impasse. 
By no means, however, do I intend to 
employ William Hundert as a straw man 
(for I admire the moral and pedagogical 
preoccupations of his story, including his 
touchstones for teaching, among them 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero); 
rather I wish to draw attention to his 
representative status – part of a long 
history and robust cycle of films that 
feature teachers-as-sages, teachers-as-
repositories-of-wisdom, teachers-as-
gurus. From ‘Petite Feuille’ in The 400 
Blows to the anonymous elementary 
school teacher in Cinema Paradiso; from 
Charles Kingsfield in The Paper Chase to 
Frank Bryant in Educating Rita; from Obi 
Wan Kenobi and Yoda in Star Wars to 
Ra’s Al Ghul in the Dark Knight trilogy, we 
are familiar with the teacher who knows, 
the teacher who transforms, the teacher 
who he teaches by imparting knowledge 
with or from authority – often by way of 
professionally credentialed training and 
sanctioned practice. Such teachers are 
‘authorized’, and in this context, one can 
spot the double-entendre. It’s not for 
nothing that the sage emerges from an 
‘order’. The occluded premise of such 
narratives, and the presumed incentive 
of their spell, lies precisely in the hope 
that, in time, after much suffering and 
shame, as the clichéd phrase renders it: 
‘the student becomes the master’. 
Hundert is part of this lineage – a noble 
tradition, to be sure – but one that does 
not account for all types of pedagogical 
intervention with students. Hopefully, M. 
Gustave – in the company of Anderson’s 
stable of similar figures – will provide 
some orientation to another, lesser-
known form of pedagogy. 
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That Anderson’s The Grand Budapest 
Hotel provides an exemplary incarnation 
of Rancière’s theory is at once a striking 
and a compelling discovery. M. Gustave’s 
confidence, cleverness, self-awareness, 
and humane apprehension of the 
motives of others make him an 
unexpectedly effective mentor for the 
young Zero. Partly we, as viewers, learn 
how this is so by the autobiographical 
story recounted by the elder Zero – in 
effect, a narrative of learning from his 
beloved ignorant schoolmaster. Through 
a close reading of selected scenes and 
portions of dialogue from the film, I aim 
to habilitate Anderson’s cinematic 
creation – especially in the compelling 
representative figure of M. Gustave – as 
a worthy articulation of Rancière’s 
uncanny and counterintuitive 
pedagogical model. 
 
Rancière’s Model: Exemplarity without 
Authority, Insight without Explication 
Jacques Rancière had a famous teacher 
in the figure of Louis Althusser, and in 
1964, Althusser wrote: ‘The function of 
teaching is to transmit a determinate 
knowledge to subjects who do not 
possess this knowledge. The teaching 
situation thus rests on the absolute 
condition of an inequality between a 
knowledge and a nonknowledge’ (1964: 
152 in Rancière 1991, italics in original). 
Althusser would seem to be articulating 
and reinforcing the most straightforward, 
even prosaic, definition of education as 
such: in short, teachers are smart, 
students are dumb, and when they meet 
in a classroom, the ambition is for the 
teacher to transmit – by myriad 
methods – the smart content to what 
Paolo Friere described (unsym-
pathetically) as ‘empty vessels’ (1970 
[1968]: 66). Friere, of course, famously in 
The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, believed 
this picture of pupils as ‘empty’ was 
dangerously inaccurate, and as a result, 
also terribly harmful to the integrity and 
potentiality of students. In his own way, 
Friere has contributed a hugely 
influential argument on liberating the 
‘oppressed’ and ignorant by means of 
questioning the asymmetry and 
inequality at the heart of the Althusserian 
classroom. Kristin Ross offers this cogent 
account of some lessons of the unequal 
classroom: 
Each [theorist – namely, Althusser, 
Pierre Bourdieu, and Jean-Claude 
Milner], that is, by beginning with 
inequality, proves it, and by proving 
it, in the end, is obliged to 
rediscover it again and again. 
Whether school is seen as the 
reproduction of inequality 
(Bourdieu) or as the potential 
instrument for the reduction of 
inequality ([Alain] Savary), the effect 
is the same: that of erecting and 
maintaining the distance 
separating a future reconciliation 
from a present inequality, a 
knowledge in the offing from 
today’s intellectual impoverishment 
– a distance discursively invented 
and reinvented so that it may never 
be abolished. The poor stay in their 
place (Ross 1991: xix).  
And by the logic of this asymmetry, the 
ignorant too remain in their place: 
forever at a distance from the (knowing, 
powerful) pedagogue, and perpetually at 
a lower level of the entrenched hierarchy. 
Rancière has described our inherited 
problem as a challenge posed by a 
prevailing educational ethos that 
implicitly validates the ‘opinion of 
inequality’ (Rancière 2016: 26). As things 
stand under this regime of ‘learning’, the 
opinion of inequality ‘is the very 
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framework within which we get educated 
and acquire knowledge’ (Rancière 2016: 
26). With Ross, and with Rancière, as 
earlier with Friere, we quickly suss out 
the political and socio-economic 
implications of the unequal classroom 
(as well as, not incidentally, the 
‘inequality of the social order’ [Rancière 
2016: 26]); and this valence of interest 
will bite at our heels throughout this 
investigation, though it remains a 
broader context – something like a 
background condition, whereas our 
attention can be said to seek after some 
of the resonant effects of this 
conditioning structure, in this case, a 
more emphatic and conscribed attention 
to the epistemic and ethical dimensions 
of the literal classroom with its teachers 
and students and texts. 
Rancière, ever-mindful of the political 
and socio-economic implications of his 
resistance to the model of inequality, 
draws our attention to a classroom in 
which the inherited hierarchies are 
dissolved and a new order emerges. 
Rancière highlights the case of Joseph 
Jacotot, a lecturer, in the early 
nineteenth century, charged with 
teaching French to Belgian students. 
‘Among those who wanted to avail 
themselves of him’, Rancière tells us at 
the outset of The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 
‘were a good number of students who 
did not speak French; but Joseph  
Jacotot knew no Flemish. There was thus 
no language in which he could teach 
them what they sought from him’ (1991 
[1987]: 1). (Flemish is Belgian Dutch, 
which is spoken in Flanders, northern 
Belgium). How, in short, could Jacotot 
find a way to teach French under the 
condition of his ignorance of Flemish, in 
effect, to teach what he did know in the 
face of what he did not know? The 
question prompts a first moment or 
reorientation to the question of teaching 
and learning – namely, who is doing 
what to whom, and how, that is, by what 
means? We may hazard replies by 
thinking anew about the ends of 
education: where do we begin and where 
do we hope to arrive? As Ross, again, 
adroitly glosses the situation with 
another question: ‘What would it mean to 
make equality a presupposition rather 
than a goal, a practice rather than a 
reward situated firmly in some distant 
future so as to all the better explain its 
present infeasibility?’ (1991: xix). Jacotot 
provides a concrete response precisely 
because he affirms equality as a 
presupposition of his classroom. For 
Jacotot, ‘knowledge is not necessary to 
teaching, nor explication necessary to 
learning’, (1991: xix) as Ross puts it. Or as 
Rancière tersely consolidates the insight: 
‘[E]xplication is the myth of pedagogy’ 
(Rancière 1991 [1987]: 6). It is a myth 
that stunts the development of pupils, 
and gives teachers a poor estimation of 
their own knowledge, and thus power 
‘over’ students (note the hierarchical 
shape of such an expression). 
Rather than counteract ignorance and 
inequality, explication sustains them –
reinforces and enhances them; this 
phenomenon is described by Ross as a 
‘homology of delay’, namely, that the 
unequal classroom ensures that the 
student will always be behind the 
teacher, and thus never catch up, much 
less exceed the scope and power of the 
knowledge-keeper (1991: xx). The 
‘pedagogical myth’ that Jacotot identifies 
‘divides the world into two: the knowing 
and the ignorant, the mature and the 
unformed, the capable and the 
incapable’ (1991: xx.). But when the 
schoolmaster is ignorant (unsettles her 
claims to knowledge and power), the 
world is one again – all stand on the 
same ground, as equals before the text. 
What does the text say? How should we 
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understand it? These are questions that 
arise from the text and are addressed to 
its audience: teacher and student alike, 
since, on this reading, they are alike. 
In Jacotot’s classroom where equality is 
a presupposition of inquiry, the teacher 
is not expected to explicate the text 
precisely because he cannot! Jacotot 
doesn’t understand Flemish, so what 
could he tell his Belgian students about 
his own language? Instead of explication, 
then, the teacher joins the inquiry at the 
same time as his students are 
empowered to claim themselves 
accomplices in the mission. The scenario 
reflects Rancière’s sense that Jacotot 
experienced an ‘intellectual adventure’. 
What preceded the adventure, however, 
was a prior, familiar, habitually held belief 
in the asymmetrical nature of instruction: 
He had believed what all 
conscientious professors believe: 
that the important business of the 
master is to transmit his 
knowledge to his students so as to 
bring them, by degrees, to his own 
level of expertise. […] In short, the 
essential act of the master was to 
explicate: to disengage the simple 
elements of learning, and to 
reconcile their simplicity in 
principle with the factual simplicity 
that characterizes young and 
ignorant minds. To teach was to 
transmit learning and to form 
minds simultaneously (Rancière 
1991 [1987]: 3, italics in original).  
Clearly this inherited model for teaching 
would not work for the French Jacotot 
and his Flemish students. Instead, 
Jacotot discovered a bilingual French/ 
Flemish edition of Télémaque (a 24-
volume novel about Telemachus by 
François Fénelon, originally published in 
1699). The novel would serve as ‘the 
minimal link of a thing in common’ 
(Rancière 1991 [1987]: 2, italics in 
original). Jacotot’s proposal was that the 
students ‘learn the French text with the 
help of the translation’. What would be 
the result of this unconventional 
intervention in the standing order of 
language education? As Félix and Victor 
Ratier wrote in 1838: 
[Jacotot] expected horrendous 
barbarisms, or maybe a complete 
inability to perform. How could 
these young people, deprived of 
explanation, understand and 
resolve the difficulties of a 
language entirely new to them? No 
matter! He had to find out where 
the route opened by chance had 
taken them, what had been the 
results of that desperate 
empiricism. And how surprised he 
was to discover that the students, 
left to themselves, managed this 
difficult step as well as many 
French could have done! Was 
wanting all that was necessary for 
doing? Were all men virtually 
capable of understanding what 
others had done and understood? 
(Ratier and Ratier 1838: 155 in 
Rancière 1991 [1987]: 2) 
From his intellectual adventure, Jacotot 
discovered – what the Ratiers re-
cognized and Rancière reconstitutes for 
our attention – that ‘the logic of the 
explicative system had to be overturned’ 
(Ratier and Ratier 1838: 155 in Rancière 
1991 [1987]: 6). Rancière glosses this 
claim by saying:  
Explication is not necessary to 
remedy an incapacity to 
understand. On the contrary, that 
very incapacity provides the 
structuring fiction of the explicative 
conception of the world. It is the 
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explicator who needs the incapable 
and not the other way around; it is 
he who constitutes the incapable 
as such. To explain something to 
someone is first of all to shown 
him he cannot understand it by 
himself (1991 [1987]: 6).  
One thinks of Alex Jurel’s (Nick Nolte) 
post-conversion pronouncement to the 
administration in Teachers (1984), after 
he abandoned his wish to resign from 
teaching: ‘The damn school wasn’t built 
for us, . . . it wasn’t built for your unions 
and lawyers and other institutions. It was 
built for the kids. They’re not here for us, 
we’re here for them. That’s what it’s 
about’. Jurel’s re-commitment is labelled 
‘crazy’ by the superintendent, to which 
he replies rhetorically: ‘What can I say? 
I’m a teacher’. And in that casual 
essentialism, Jurel confirms the secret 
tragedy that lurks in the heart of this 
‘inspirational story’, namely, that when he 
returns to the classroom – perhaps with 
only half of the school’s students in 
attendance, having written off the rest –
he will most likely recuperate the habits 
of the asymmetrical classroom. He will 
be there for them – but as what? A kind 
of savior? Yet, by what powers – the 
powers of the knowing over the ignorant? 
Dedication to teaching (for example, faith 
in its form), we fear, is not sufficient for 
what may be possible within the event of 
teaching. Jurel may be restored to his 
prior position in the classroom, but will 
his students be any better off? With the 
explicative model, the teacher – even 
one who is ‘knowledgeable, enlightened, 
and of good faith’ – will inadvertently 
ossify inequality and render an ‘enforced 
stultification [abrutir – to render stupid; 
to treat like a brute]’ (1991 [1987]: 6). 
In the explicative model we find the 
teacher as a ‘mediating intelligence’ 
between the text and the student: like a 
priest between believer and holy spirit! 
With Jacotot’s experiment (and in 
Rancière’s emancipatory model based 
on it), however,  
a pure relationship of will to will 
had been established between 
master and student: a relationship 
wherein the master’s domination 
resulted in an entirely liberated 
relationship between the 
intelligence of the student and that 
of the book – the intelligence of 
the book that was also the thing in 
common, the egalitarian 
intellectual link between master 
and student (1991 [1987]: 13). 
Now instead of the student having to 
pass through the mediating influence of 
the teacher in order to read the text, the 
‘student was linked to a will, Jacotot’s, 
and to an intelligence, the book’s – the 
two entirely distinct’ (1991 [1987]: 13).  
The crux of Jacotot’s radical pedagogy, 
however, is not simply or strictly the 
ignorance of the schoolmaster – that, 
like Socrates, he could (and did!) call out 
‘I must teach you that I have nothing to 
teach you’ – but that ‘one can teach 
what one doesn’t know if the student is 
emancipated, that is to say, if he is 
obliged to use his own intelligence’ (1991 
[1987]: 15). Where the Old Master 
pedagogue is an explicator (for a 
powerless student), the New Master 
pedagogue must be an emancipator (for 
an empowered student). By this rationale 
and reordering, Rancière concludes: 
‘Whoever teaches without emancipating 
stultifies. And whoever emancipates 
doesn’t have to worry about what the 
emancipated person learns’. Whereas the 
explicator was positioned as a 
gatekeeper – a priest of knowledge to 
be incrementally, but never totally 
dispensed with (for if totally, then the 
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explicator becomes useless, 
unnecessary, a remainder deserving her 
own dismissal from the classroom), the 
emancipator is not responsible for 
content but for the conditions of 
learning. The New Master is called to 
teach the event of education, not to 
program what it will contain, what it will 
mean. The student ‘will learn what he 
wants, nothing maybe’, but that is not the 
emancipator’s concern – liberation is his 
mandate, not control and dissemination. 
 
M. Gustav: Humane Responses to a 
Humanitarian Crisis 
It is in the spirit of the emancipator 
pedagogue – one who frees his student 
to the power(s) of her own reason – that 
we turn to Wes Anderson’s The Grand 
Budapest Hotel, a film noted at once for 
its ‘archness and deliberation’ as by its 
‘sense of foreboding and menace’ (Itzkoff 
2014). As we follow the contours of the 
mise-en-abîme or (given the imagined 
geography, perhaps more fittingly) the 
Russian-doll approach to regressive 
temporal placement (from present day to 
1985 to 1968 to 1932), we land, at last, 
in a Stephen Zweig-inspired alternate 
Eastern Europe – in the ‘farthest eastern 
boundary of the European continent, the 
former republic of Zubrowka, once the 
seat of an empire’ – and meet M. Gustav 
H., concierge at one of the continent’s 
finest hotels. The first thing we are 
responsible for addressing is the very 
obvious fact that M. Gustav is, well, not a 
teacher. This is, of course, literally true. 
After rehearsing Jacotot’s intellectual 
adventure, and Rancière’s pronounced 
celebration of it, I seem to have found 
myself without a teacher, students, or a 
classroom. Yet this absence makes my 
point before I can make it! For the 
subgenre of films we might describe as 
‘teacher films’ or ‘school films’ or ‘films 
about education’ by and large lack a 
New Master pedagogue. From Goodbye, 
Mr. Chips to The Browning Version to The 
Paper Chase to The Karate Kid to Ferris 
Bueller’s Day Off to Good Will Hunting to 
Miracle to Whiplash – and very pro-
minently in The Emperor’s Club – we 
continually, perpetually encounter the 
Old Master explicator; and despite a 
broad range of demonstrated techniques 
(instruction, inspiration, indirection, and 
not to be overlooked – sadistic rule, 
etc.), teachers in these films remain the 
sources of order and orientation, and the 
keepers/dispensers of knowledge (even 
when they fail to teach, and many of 
them do fail). So, it is something of a 
surprise, and an edifying accident – not 
unlike Jacotot’s discovery of the bilingual 
Télémaque – that suggests The Grand 
Budapest Hotel as a candidate for 
illustrating the qualities and credentials 
of the pedagogical emancipator, the New 
Master, in the figure of M. Gustav. 
Perhaps it is a satisfying, for some even a 
logical outcome, since it would appear 
we need to leave school in order to 
learn. Not incidentally, though, my 
pursuit of what Stanley Cavell has called 
‘themes out of school’ involves an 
attempt to find a way back in – yet in a 
new register of relation to the task (the 
calling, even) of teaching and learning, 
and the place and space in which they 
are said to occur. What teacher hasn’t 
concluded a rigorous and demanding 
semester feeling low, and wondering 
hopefully, if also asking in anguished 
solicitation, about the next term, ‘How 
can I do things differently – better –
 next time?’ 
We begin with a job interview. Zero is not 
enrolling in school, though he might as 
well be. M. Gustav asks ‘Who are you?’ – 
‘Zero, the new lobby boy’ comes the 
quick reply. And it appears that his name 
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is also an adjective for his pedigree and 
credentials: ‘Experience?’ – ‘Zero’. 
‘Education?’ – ‘Zero’. ‘Family?’ – ‘Zero’. 
(Note the radical inversion of numbers 
and values: if we have a teacher named 
Hundert [100], we also have a ‘student’ 
named Zero [0]. That such meanings lay 
on the surface of the text does not 
diminish their impact.) ‘Why do you want 
to be a lobby boy?’ – ‘Because the Grand 
Budapest is an institution’. After many in-
auspicious replies, this was the right 
answer for it appealed to M. Gustav’s 
Aristotelian sense that service is a kind 
of practice and an institution is the 
context for its exercise (albeit, as neo-
Aristotelian Alasdair MacIntyre has 
written, necessarily underwritten by 
‘competitiveness’ and the ‘corrupting 
power’ of institutions [MacIntyre 1981: 
181]). 
The elder Zero reports in retrospect: ‘And 
so my life began’, and in this new life, the 
practices of running a fine hotel and the 
institutional nature of the operation are 
framed as an educational and moral 
endeavour: ‘I became his pupil’, Zero 
says, ‘and he was to become my counsel 
and guardian’. Note that Zero doesn’t 
match ‘pupil’ with the expected tandem-
term, ‘teacher’, but instead words 
befitting a mentor or an accomplice. 
Nevertheless, the film begins with an 
asymmetry familiar to the teacher-
student relationship – the first ‘lesson’? 
‘Keep your mouth shut, Zero’ – followed 
by M. Gustav’s nightly sermon (including 
pithy bromides: ‘Rudeness is merely the 
expression of fear’). Yet the trend of the 
film moves the Gustav-Zero relationship 
progressively from hierarchy to equality. 
When M. Gustav is on the train, sitting 
across from Zero, seemingly poised to 
offer the boy another ‘sermon’, he 
interrupts himself: ‘It’s what we provide in 
our own humble, insignificant . . . oh, fuck 
it’. Here M. Gustav undermines his own 
authority, mocks his sententiousness and 
(attempted) grandiloquence, and 
punctures his false modesty, thereby 
turning a sermon into a confession. And 
who was there to hear it? No one other 
than – none other than – Zero, now 
seated in a position of equality (seated at 
the same level, not spoken ‘down’ to); as 
such, in this mode of relation, Zero has a 
chance to learn from Gustav’s 
unexpected revelation of character. In 
the midst of a dawning humanitarian 
crisis – the outbreak of war – Gustav 
slowly shifts away from a strident 
authoritarianism and toward a more 
unvarnished humanism. He teaches 
indirectly, by virtue of his own 
vulnerability, his own exposure. In the 
throes of his own ignorance, he is 
making himself known.  
Moments before claiming his bequest 
from Madame Céline Villeneuve Desgoffe 
und Taxis – Madame D. (Tilda Swinton), 
the painting Boy with Apple – Gustav 
pauses to offer Zero a lesson on the 
aesthetics of representation, and in the 
process makes an inadvertent parallel 
between his charge and the subject 
within the frame: a ‘portrayal of a 
beautiful boy on the cusp of manhood’. 
When, not long after, Gustav writes from 
prison (for having stolen the painting), he 
seems painfully aware of such 
transitions, and the loss of his former 
position: ‘a great and noble house is 
under your protection’. Despite Gustav’s 
ordeals – how he might be used or 
harmed or wronged by others – he 
doesn’t harbor jealousy or resentment, 
and says as much when interviewing 
Agatha (Saoirse Ronan), offering her a 
lesson that not she but Zero needs to 
learn: ‘Never be jealous in this life, not 
even for an instant’. Zero’s affection for 
Gustav, as it might be for any suave and 
compelling teacher, leaves him 
vulnerable to fears of betrayal. But time 
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and again, Gustav doesn’t become 
another such cliché, but instead admits 
his errors, and confounds Zero – and we 
alike – with his humility. 
After Gustav has escaped from prison –
with help from his band of prison-mates, 
and on the outside from Zero and 
Agatha – he scolds Zero for making a 
mistake, as a teacher might – ‘But it’s 
not how I trained you’ – and rants 
against and insults the boy who just 
risked his life to free him. Yet after Zero 
shares more details about his early life –
his family murdered in the war, his 
refugee status – Gustav doesn’t 
entrench, but instead softens: ‘I suppose 
I ought to take back everything I just 
said. What a bloody idiot I am, a pathetic 
fool, a goddamn selfish bastard. This is 
disgraceful and it’s beneath the 
standards of the Grand Budapest. I 
apologize on behalf of the hotel’. Here, 
still sustaining the Aristotelian outlook, 
Gustav blends an accounting of his 
personal behaviour with his practice as a 
concierge within an institution. And 
importantly, he diminishes his sense of 
control and expertise by claiming idiocy 
and foolishness, and acting below the 
conventions (of the hotel) he aspires to 
maintain (through embodied 
performance). Zero, to his credit, accepts 
the apology without fuss or 
recrimination: ‘It’s okay’. But Gustav 
protests, aiming to make sure Zero truly 
knows the genuineness of his apology: 
‘Don’t make excuses for me. I owe you 
my life. You are my dear friend and 
protégé. I am very proud of you’. Zero 
interprets the further erosion of 
hierarchy and authority with a 
sentimental appeal to shared experience: 
‘We’re brothers’. And M. Gustav nods his 
acknowledgment of this proposed 
consanguinity. These two men – unequal 
in age, experience, education, national 
origin, citizenship, race, rank, and much 
else – find new terms to express their 
relationship: a friendship (of equality), a 
companionable mentorship (with Zero as 
‘protégé’), and a brotherly bond (if only, 
but importantly, brothers in the fraternity 
of hoteliers, such as The Society of the 
Crossed Keys). 
As M. Gustav is intent on preserving the 
standards and traditions familiar to the 
Grand Budapest, and befitting a fine 
hotel, he must find ways of training his 
staff, and, in time, for ceding his power to 
them. A brief vignette, about ten minutes 
from the end of the film, shows Zero, 
now promoted, passing on a bit of 
Gustav’s advice (given to him early on, as 
the first lesson of the lobby boy, viz., keep 
your mouth shut), to Otto, the new lobby 
boy: ‘Well, you haven’t been trained 
properly, Otto. A lobby boy never 
provides information of that kind. You’re 
a stone wall. Understood?’ In this 
moment of instruction, Zero, himself still 
aware of his former position, and now 
possessed of relevant knowledge, draws 
young Otto into the fold and fray of the 
fraternity. Proper training, in this context, 
is a form of mentorship, of brotherhood. 
Like the Russian-doll time sequencing 
that brings us into the film and takes us 
out of it, the generations of hotel staff 
encode lessons that are embodied and 
imbued from person to person, in the 
practice of running the place: from 
Gustav to Zero to Otto, and beyond down 
the line (and sometimes at odd angles, 
as when Agatha joins the circle of 
‘fraternal’ relations). All the while, we are 
meant to remember – as Gustav admits 
of himself, ‘of course’ – he too was once 
a lobby boy at the Grand Budapest. In so 
far as he notes this homology, Gustav 
finds another way to inscribe his equality 
with Zero. They stand shoulder-to-
shoulder before the grand ambitions of 
the Grand Budapest – what service 
within the esteemed institution might 
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mean for them as its dedicated keepers 
and practitioners. 
When the mature Zero Moustafa reports 
of Gustav’s fate to his dinner-guest, the 
anonymously named ‘Author’ (Jude Law/ 
Tom Wilkinson) over supper in 1968, he 
doesn’t admire Gustav’s authority or 
appeals to prestige, but rather, his flaws: 
‘He was the same as his disciples 
[namely, the lady-guests he serviced]: 
insecure, vain, superficial, blonde, needy. 
[…] In the end, [because Madame D. 
made him her successor], he was even 
rich’. Gustav, illustrating Zero’s point, and 
undermining it at the same time with 
generosity, said of his protégé: ‘This one 
[viz., Zero] finally surpassed me [as 
concierge], although I must say he had 
an exceptional teacher’. Zero confirms 
the assessment: ‘True’. 
As the young Zero repeated Gustav’s 
lesson for the younger Otto, so does the 
mature Zero repeat Gustav’s sober train 
commentary (from Part II) to his dinner-
guest: ‘There are still faint glimmers of 
civilization left in this barbarian 
slaughterhouse that was once known as 
humanity’. In the final moments of the 
film, Zero makes sure the Author knows 
that Gustav was ‘one of them’ – that is, 
one of those ‘faint glimmers of 
civilization’. And concludes definitively: 
‘What more is there to say?’ 
Gustav shows that no matter how 
different he is from Zero – and how 
unformed Zero is, especially at the 
beginning – ‘the minimal link of a thing 
in common’, as Rancière put it, is their 
humanity. And their humanity, in this 
depiction, is something that emerges 
through their practices within the 
institution of the hotel – the thing in 
common that they discover they share 
as part of their institutional 
commitments. Each occasion of their 
practice as hoteliers is a chance to be 
humane, or not – that is, to fail at being 
human, or sufficiently humane. As the 
mature Zero says to the Author, ‘We 
shared a vocation’. And this sharing 
makes all the difference when 
appreciating how M. Gustav H. was, in the 
sense drawn from Jacotot and Rancière, 
an ‘ignorant schoolmaster’. Even in his 
moments of explication, Gustav seldom 
lost sight of his humanity and that of his 
quarry: even as he was prone to the 
habits of power and hierarchy that 
defined his profession, he actively 
diminished his earned or granted 
authority as concierge, and cultivated the 
powers of those with whom he ostensibly 
‘oversaw’. These are all traits of the New 
Master pedagogue – the emancipator – 
who teaches not from on high, but on 
level ground, in the intimacy of the face-
to-face, re-orienting attention to the 
shared object of inquiry or interest (in 
this case, the performative traits of 
exemplary hotel staff, perhaps especially 
vital in wartime, when the threats to 
civilization – its qualities, its virtues, its 
values –descend in most acute attack), 
and where among other things, he is 
exposed for his common humanity, and 
thus vulnerability, ignorance, and error.  
Gustav and Zero both struggle with ‘the 
results of that desperate empiricism’ 
they were forced to contend with not just 
during wartime – the people who killed 
Zero’s family and exiled him; the people 
who would deny Gustav Madame D.’s 
bequest (and when claimed [stolen!]), 
and also his freedom, his station at the 
hotel, etc. – but more generally, in the 
troubled state of their profession. As the 
mature Zero recounts it to the Author: 
‘To be frank, I think his world vanished 
long before he ever entered it’. But what 
‘world’ is this? Not just the ordered and 
elegant world of fine European hotels, 
but the world where the ‘faint glimmers 
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of civilization’ were more pronounced, 
where a shared humanity and a shared 
vocation were the daily conditions for 
expressing and reinforcing the best of 
such civilization. Without being unduly 
sentimental, though perhaps just such 
feeling is what is called for, learning how 
to be human was an honourable 
vocation. If Philosophy from antiquity 
made its task ‘learning how to die’, and 
die well, so perhaps this modern 
condition – fraught as it is with warfare 
and attacks upon humanity – demands 
the mission of ‘learning how to live’, and 
live well. The mature Zero’s reflections on 
life with Gustav, at the Grand Budapest 
and beyond it, are surely prone to 
nostalgia – a force that commonly 
distorts the past and distracts us from its 
realities. Yet Zero’s affection for Gustav –
and for the hotel that became the 
shared site of their life’s work, the 
context for their sharing of a vocation – 
is based on Gustav’s error-laden 
humanity, not his perfection; on his 
confirmation of equality, not his stubborn 
insistence of his own privilege and 
priority. Zero learned more from Gustav, 
and loved him more, not because of his 
powers as a teacher, or explicator, of 
grand lessons, but because Gustav 
joined Zero in friendship, in fraternity as 
experimenters engaged in a mutually 
undertaken professional endeavour. 
Zero’s unyielding affection for Gustav 
rests not on his experience of instruction 
from him but of emancipation by him.  
 
Mr. Hundert: Teacher of Facts, Molder 
of Character? 
If we have found in M. Gustav an 
unexpected New Pedagogue – an 
emancipatory figure, the New Master –
we find in Mr. Hundert, an Old 
Pedagogue, a confirmed representative 
of the (still) dominant class of Old 
Masters. Yet Hundert doesn’t stand in a 
posture of menace and sadism, a 
teacher using (or abusing) his height in 
the hierarchy (as in Whiplash; or for that 
matter, any war film that features a drill 
instructor – such as in Full Metal Jacket 
or G. I. Jane; and any sports film, where 
the coach draws from punishment-as-
training, e.g., as in Rocky, Miracle, or 
Warrior), but rather appears as an 
earnest figure caught up in a mood of 
pathetic bewilderment. Hundert means 
to do well by his methodology, so he is 
surprised – shocked and saddened –
when it proves ineffective, especially for 
one of his students, Sedgewick Bell. 
While many other pupils may attest to 
Hundert’s positive effect on their lives, 
The Emperor’s Club becomes a 
meditation on the student who remained 
fractious in the face of the teacher’s 
lessons: the student who seemed 
convicted by a rejection of and 
condescension to his teacher’s approach 
to education – an approach that dep-
ends on imparting a lesson, as if from 
history, from authority, from reason. 
When Bell remains unreceptive to 
Hundert’s pronouncements of propriety, 
delivered early and late in Bell’s life (for 
example, as in the ‘one last lecture’ he 
gives in the bathroom at story’s end), we, 
like Hundert, are given an occasion to 
reflect on the role of the teacher as such. 
What is it that teachers are supposed to 
do for, or with, their students? 
In the opening scenes of The Emperor’s 
Club, in a montage of dual time registers, 
we hear Mr. William Hundert speak in 
voiceover – ‘I am a teacher, simply that’ 
– while taking stock of his knowledge: 
‘I’m certain of only two things: days that 
begin with rowing on a lake are better 
than days that do not; second, “A man’s 
character is his fate”’. It matters little that 
he elides giving Heraclitus credit for the 
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sentiment, but it is quite consequential 
for our glimpse of Hundert’s certainties 
that character is of paramount concern. 
If character is, indeed, fate, then we must 
rush to ask: is character itself fated, or is 
one free to create one’s character, which 
in time, registers one’s fate? It becomes 
clear that Hundert is Aristotelian on this 
front, that character is the short word for 
all the actions we undertake, the habits 
we abide by, and more generally, the 
‘activity of the soul’ in accordance with 
excellence (arête) and human flourishing 
(eudaimonia) (Aristotle 1941: 1098a15, 
943). 
Hundert is a teacher of history, more 
precisely ancient Greek and Roman 
history, and he operates his classroom 
under the unspoken (but hopefully 
evident) claim that learning the facts of 
history – especially the acts of particular, 
exemplary men – becomes the condition 
for the student’s moral education. The 
venerable tradition of imitatio is in full 
effect. 
Hundert reveals his Aristotelian 
credentials by emphasizing two kinds of 
virtue familiar to the Nicomachean 
Ethics: intellectual and moral. Intellectual 
virtue can be taught directly (through 
lessons, by means of facts), while moral 
virtue cannot – it must be inculcated, 
slowly, steadily, and surely from birth 
onward; the school motto is ‘the end 
depends upon the beginning’. Since St. 
Benedict’s, where Hundert teaches, is a 
boarding school for boys, he, quite 
naturally, nurtures their intellectual virtue 
during class time and their moral virtue 
in the canteen, the ball field, and the 
dorm room. A childless adult (who never 
expresses any interest in having children 
of his own, or remorse for lacking them), 
Hundert carries himself as someone 
who, nevertheless, is capable of 
attending to the kinds of emotional 
details of character that a parent would 
otherwise address (whether they be 
minor modes of discipline, such as lights 
out; or severe infractions, such as 
cheating and lying). As Robert Coles has 
noted: ‘our schools and colleges these 
days don’t take major responsibility for 
the moral values of their students, but, 
rather, assume that their students 
acquire those values at home’ (Coles 
2010: 353). Yet, when school is home, as 
it is for these boys at St. Benedict’s, then 
the scope of Hundert’s pedagogy widens 
from the precincts of the classroom (and 
its demand for the promotion of 
intellectual virtue) into the moral and 
emotional domains of the students, in 
Martin Luther King’s resonant phrase, 
‘the content of their character’. 
In class, as Hundert tells his students 
about the fate of Shutruk Nahunte (a 
conqueror who left no contribution and 
so is ‘without significance’, forgotten to 
history), or the qualities of Brutus (‘the 
most moral man in Rome’), Hundert 
presumes that becoming intimately 
familiar with the lives of men – in effect, 
caught up in their behaviors, decision 
making, and character – will naturally, 
logically reinforce one’s own edification. 
Notice, then, that Hundert presumes – it 
might even be a point of his vanity – that 
such ‘intellectual’ training in the lives of 
‘great men’ will, in fact, rub off on the 
students’ moral education during class; 
he teaches as if the lives of these 
illustrious men are self-evidently 
efficacious for learning how one ought to 
behave in and out of school. Hundert 
sees a through-line: knowing is believing 
is acting is character is fate. 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle: these are ‘men 
of profound character’, he tells the boys; 
when they don a toga, like their ancient 
Greek forbears, they are partaking in a 
symbol marking the ‘transition from the 
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child to the man’. Invoking Socrates, 
Hundert makes a distinction: ‘It is not 
living that matters, but living rightly’. 
Sedgewick Bell demurs, however, and 
repeatedly embarrasses Hundert with 
sarcasm, stunts, and general silliness; 
Bell has little patience for any lessons 
from history, and still less for Hundert’s 
confidence in a kind of cross-temporal 
osmosis of good character. Bell thinks 
Brutus was stupid for not killing Marc 
Antony (so he, Marc Antony, could ‘win’); 
when so brazen a challenge is made to 
Hundert’s reading of history and 
character, in short, his pedagogical 
authority, his response is not an 
encouragement of Bell’s line of thinking 
(to pursue it, to test it, and perhaps to 
defeat it), but rather a resistance to it as 
if to a threat. Dismissive of Bell’s 
utilitarian calculus, his intuitive grasp of 
the political exigencies of ‘dirty hands’, 
(Walzer 2007) and confident in his own 
authority as a teacher, and a student of 
history, as a knower of truths, Hundert 
entrenches. 
In a bid to bring Bell around, Hundert 
undertakes a solo field trip to 
Washington, D.C. to meet with 
Sedgewick’s father, Senator Hiram Bell –
a figure meant to combine the 
stereotypes of the powerful authoritarian 
and the distant father along with the 
anachronistic patriarchal swagger 
familiar to a certain picture of Southern 
heritage (a loaded gun, a lit cigar), and 
not to be missed, an instance of a non-
academic’s cynical anti-intellectualism. 
Hiram hails from West Virginia, a 
geographically and socially hybrid 
culture, and thus presumably is meant to 
represent a wide swath of just this sort 
of father, politician, and nonacademic. 
Though Hundert has come to report on 
Sedgewick’s ‘difficulty paying attention’, 
the Senator’s perpetual distractedness 
might have given Hundert a clue to the 
origin of the malady. Still, Hundert 
proceeds with the presumption that he 
will find an ally in the Senator, but 
instead, and again, he hears an echo of 
Sedgewick’s skepticism and contempt: 
‘What’s the good of what you’re teaching 
these boys?’ Hundert risks stating the 
obvious, lacing it with what may be a 
false deference to authority – ‘I don’t 
have to tell you, sir’ – but then does just 
that by recounting how ancient Greek 
democracy gave credence to American’s 
bid for the same; how Plato, Aristotle, 
and Cicero, among others, exemplified 
civic virtue, character, and conviction. 
Hundert concludes, respectfully, but still 
defiantly: ‘Sir, it’s my job to mold your 
son’s character’. The Senator bridles at 
the suggestion – laughs mockingly at his 
guest, looks down on him from on high, 
then stirs to indignation, scolding and 
correcting his son’s teacher: ‘That is a 
horse that can talk . . . Mold him? Jesus, 
God in heaven, you’re not going to mold 
my boy. Your job is to teach my son. You 
teach him his times tables, teach him 
why the world is round, teach him who 
killed who and when and where – that is 
your job. You, sir, will not mold my son. I 
will mold him’. 
Hundert and Senator Bell clearly have 
different conceptions of what teachers 
(can and should) do for their students, 
and what fathers (might) do for their 
children (in this case, sons). In the wake 
of the Senator’s query (‘What’s the good 
of what you’re teaching’) and his 
correction (‘You, sir, will not mold my 
son’), we are left to wonder about the 
duties and mandates of the teacher: 
does Hundert overstep his role as a 
teacher? Or is the Senator insensible to 
what teachers (such as Hundert) are for 
– especially teachers of boys for whom 
their fathers are largely absent (or if 
present, then who remain absent-
minded, or provide a questionable moral 
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model)?1 These questions come in for a 
reply as we consider the shared qualities 
of mentorship exhibited by Hundert (as a 
teacher) and Gustav (as a concierge); 
both of these childless men are also 
depicted, implicitly and occasionally 
explicitly, as fathering, or otherwise at 
least offering fraternal guidance to their 
charges. As in The Grand Budapest Hotel, 
so now in The Emperor’s Club, we are 
encouraged not only to think about the 
protagonists (respectively, the concierge, 
the teacher) and their practices, but also 
the institutions in which those practices 
play out (viz., the hotel, the school). It is 
worth emphasizing the differences 
between the hotel and the club 
(academic and otherwise), for the hotel is 
a space in which all are admitted who 
can afford the accommodation, whereas 
a club is predicated on some criterion of 
exclusivity (though, so often, that 
criterion is also money-based or class-
based, or otherwise marked by traits that 
divide insiders from outsiders). For 
guests of an illustrious hotel, there is an 
implied egalitarianism (often simply 
called hospitality), whereas for the 
preparatory school, for instance, the 
presumption is entry based on merit, 
retention based on performance (or 
again, less idealistically or naïvely, based !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 As befits the present study of these specific 
films, there is an emphasis on the education of 
adolescent men, yet the lessons of Rancière and 
the others remain pertinent to all students. For a 
more extended study of education and 
adolescent girls, see David LaRocca, ‘We Were 
Educated for This? Paideia, Agonism, and the 
Liberal Arts’, Girls and Philosophy: This Book Isn’t 
a Metaphor for Anything, ed. Robert Greene and 
Rachel Robison Greene (Chicago: Open Court, 
2015), 199-218. For another scene of education 
and female adolescence, see David LaRocca, ‘“A 
Lead Ball of Justice”: The Logic of Retribution and 
the Ethics of Instruction in True Grit’ in The 
Philosophy of the Coen Brothers (updated 
edited), ed. Mark Conard (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 307-32. 
 
on monetary contributions in the form of 
tuition and gifts). But then we know that 
Zero is a penniless, uneducated orphan 
and refugee – a victim of war’s 
contingencies – whereas Sedgewick is 
the privileged son of a U.S. Senator. So, if 
there are obvious differences between 
concierge and teacher, between hotel 
and club, then so also are they apparent 
between the young protagonists – Zero 
and Sedgewick – who stand in need of 
an education. 
When seen in tandem, Zero and 
Sedgewick’s scenes of education, bring 
into subtle form the manner in which 
both films – The Grand Budapest Hotel 
and The Emperor’s Club – are principally 
preoccupied with the teaching of moral 
virtue, what is called ‘character’ in the 
latter film, and is understood as a certain 
mode of relating to humanity in the 
former (e.g., ‘faint glimmers of 
civilization’). While, for example, Hundert 
is full of facts, ever ready to call up an 
historical figure for consideration, his 
primary ambition is the use of such facts 
for the constitution of character. As he 
helps Sedgewick check out a library 
book, he assures the librarian: ‘I can 
vouch for this boy’s character’. And later, 
when Hundert is trying to understand 
Bell’s motivation for cheating, he speaks 
of ‘being blind to deficiencies in his 
character’. Likewise for Gustav, personal 
conduct is the hallmark of judging 
service; this seems especially the case 
for those professions, such as the 
running of a hotel, where service is the 
practice. Thus, for Gustav, being rude or 
telling other people’s secrets is a mortal 
infraction on the character of the 
servicemen. We find a close variant on 
Gustav’s lessons, sermons, and 
confessions when reading Kazuo 
Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day, in 
which the head butler, Mr. Stevens, 
discusses what he calls the ‘dignity’ of 
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England’s finest butlers (Ishiguro 1988: 
33-34). Similar sentiments about the 
propriety of service staff are also evident 
in Julian Fellowes’ Downton Abbey, most 
often deriving from pronouncements 
made by the abbey’s head butler, Mr. 
Carson.2 
Twenty-five years after Sedgewick 
graduated from St. Benedict’s, Hundert is 
invited to reconvene the Mr. Julius 
Caesar competition, which was in the 
1970s, the scene of Sedgewick’s moral 
breach (he cheated). We, along with 
Hundert, are encouraged to think the 
mature Sedgewick has created the 
conditions for his redemption – perhaps 
a function of a lifelong guilt in need of 
expiation. Instead, we, along with 
Hundert, are shocked to see Sedgewick 
– now a grown man, with two sons of his 
own – cheat yet again. While the 
audience at the competition cannot hear 
the irony, we recognize it when (after 
cheating), Sedgewick toasts his former 
teacher by saying ‘Your virtue is a 
beacon of light’. Needless to say, it’s time 
for Hundert to repair to the bathroom 
and splash his face with cold water. Bell 
enters, Hundert confronts him on his 
inveterate ethical infraction, and offers 
‘one last lecture’, one final lesson in the 
wake of admitting ‘I failed you as a 
teacher’: ‘All of us, at some point, are 
forced to look at ourselves in the mirror 
and see who we really are. And when !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See David LaRocca ‘Memories. In the End, Is 
that All There Is?’ in Downton Abbey and 
Philosophy, ed. Adam Barkman and Robert Arp 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2015), 151-62. To draw a 
perhaps unexpected pairing, we glean a parallel 
attention to service-equals-practice (though of a 
decidedly amoral vintage) in the figures of various 
bounty hunters. See David LaRocca, ‘The Ballad 
of Boba Fett: Mercenary Agency and Amoralism 
in War’ in The Ultimate Star Wars and Philosophy: 
You Must Unlearn What You Have Learned, ed. 
Jason T. Eberl and Kevin S. Decker (Oxford: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2016), 79-90. 
that day comes for you Sedgewick, you 
will be confronted with a life lived 
without virtue, without principle, and for 
that I pity you. End of lesson’. Once again, 
and at last, we might think Bell will be 
chastened, but instead Bell is indignant: 
‘What can I say, Mr. Hundert? Who gives a 
shit? Honestly, who out there gives a shit 
about your principles and your virtues. I 
mean, look at you: What do you have to 
show for yourself? I live in the real world, 
where people do what they do to get 
what they want. And if it’s lying and it’s 
cheating, then so be it’. Hundert is, not 
surprisingly, gutted by Bell’s unflinching 
castigation, and, to be sure, his lack of 
moral perspicacity – especially now, as a 
grown man with children, sons of his 
own. Hundert’s disequilibrium, however, 
will be joined soon enough by Sedgewick 
himself. For it is the appearance of Bell’s 
son, Robert, out of a clandestine perch in 
the bathroom stall that confirms the 
lasting damage of Bell’s attitude: passing 
from Hiram to Sedgewick, and now from 
Sedgewick to his son, Robert, a legacy of 
compromised moral character has been 
drawn. Instead of the lineage of 
character and service we found from 
Gustav to Zero to Otto (and beyond 
them, and before them, and outwardly to 
The Society of the Crossed Keys), we 
encounter with Hiram and Sedgewick a 
bona fide tradition of callous disregard 
for the cultivation of moral character. As 
if ethical corruption were a virus or a 
biological constituent, like a strand of 
defining DNA, we see the young Robert’s 
face and wonder about the effect this 
bathroom conversation will have on his 
life, and the legacy beyond it – to his 
children. 
The Emperor’s Club concludes with 
Hundert reminding himself that one 
failure – that the loss of one student to 
moral turpitude – doesn’t, or shouldn’t, 
define a life, his life (or his sense of 
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success within it, perhaps especially, as a 
teacher). Clearly Hundert doesn’t have 
wealth and power and broad or popular 
influence to show for his life’s efforts, but 
he may find a meaningful legacy in those 
students who used his facts, his lessons, 
to cultivate a more praiseworthy 
character than Bell. The subplot with 
Martin Blythe (Paul Dano/ Steven Culp) is 
meant to show a counter-instance to 
Sedgewick Bell, and to assure us that 
Hundert can himself be the beneficiary 
of the high moral character that he, in 
some way, contributed to (as when 
Blythe forgives Hundert’s early treachery, 
and sends his son, Martin Jr., into 
Hundert’s class – doubtless a bold 
indication of forgiveness, mercy, and 
trust in his former teacher). Still, we are 
left to wonder if Blythe did, in fact, learn 
how to behave this generously from 
Hundert. 
Echoing the opening Heraclitean 
apothegm, Hundert claims that ‘however 
much we stumble, it is a teacher’s 
burden to always hope that with learning 
a boy’s character might be changed, and 
so the destiny of a man’. Hundert here 
sounds in sympathy with Simone Weil, 
who (in a gloss provided by Mario von 
der Ruhr), encouraged us to believe that 
‘the education of the young is always 
conducted under the banner of hope’ 
(2006: 37) – but it is not a vague and 
amorphous hope. Rather, as we find 
further realignment to the Hericlitean 
notion – hearing that Ralph Waldo 
Emerson told the group of young men 
gathered at the edge of his podium in 
1837, ‘Character is higher than intellect’ 
– so we may conclude that Hundert 
privileges moral virtue over intellectual 
virtue (Emerson 1983 [1837]: 62). If the 
(intellectually achieved) facts are not in 
the service of (moral) character, they 
aren’t worthy of our dedication. 
 
Rancière’s Pedagogical Lesson: 
Education as the Poetic Labor of 
Translation 
Hundert is very much in the cast of an 
Old Pedagogue – a classic explicator –
asking his students to fill in the blanks 
posed by his leading questions. While not 
as transgressive and egalitarian as 
Gustav, Hundert nevertheless shares with 
him an orientation to the character of 
the boys under his command (a not 
insignificant word that links an education 
by the Old Master with martial values). 
That is to say, Gustav and Hundert reveal 
how their mandate may be different, or 
broader, than Jacotot’s. Remember that 
for Jacotot, his ambition was to teach 
French to Belgian students: this was an 
education in translation. But Gustav and 
Hundert are concerned – if we may call 
on, again, the Aristotelian sense of these 
words – with the quality of young souls: 
this is an education in moral virtue. An 
education in character will require a 
different kind of translation: for the 
concierge, it means interpreting the 
conduct of service professionals in 
relation to their guests, and the care of 
the institution in which these 
relationships flourish; for the teacher of 
history and moral philosophy, it means 
interpreting the conduct of 
representative people in relation to the 
virtues their actions embody, and in time 
codify for the rest of us. 
When Rancière returns to the question 
or status of the ignorant schoolmaster in 
The Emancipated Spectator, two 
decades after his first book on the 
subject appeared, he retains an interest 
in this work of ‘the poetic labour of 
translation’ (Rancière 2009 [2008]: 10). 
And in doing so, he helps us sort the 
moments of similarity – and difference –
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in our study of Gustav and Hundert by 
providing alternative tropes for the 
education of the uneducated:  
The distance the ignoramus has to 
cover is not the gulf between her 
ignorance and the schoolmaster’s 
knowledge. It is simply the path 
from what she already knows to 
what she does not yet know, but 
which she can learn just as she 
has learnt the rest (Rancière 2009 
[2008]: 10-11).  
As we conclude here, we can assess 
Gustav’s candidacy as a New Pedagogue 
and Hundert’s (perhaps reluctant, even 
pathetic loyalty to his) status as an Old 
Pedagogue by determining the degree to 
which each has ‘uncoupled his mastery 
from his knowledge’ (Rancière 2009 
[2008]: 11). While Hundert believes 
Sedgewick must be taught, and Senator 
Bell believes his son must be molded, 
both modes of address presume that 
Sedgewick’s ‘ignorance is not a lesser 
form of knowledge, but the opposite of 
knowledge’ (Rancière 2009 [2008]: 9). By 
way of contrast, as an ignorant 
schoolmaster, Gustav comes to learn for 
himself, in fits and starts, and eventually 
with some confidence that, as Rancière 
puts it: ‘there is no ignoramus who does 
not already know a mass of things, who 
has not learnt them by herself, by 
listening and looking around her, by 
observation and repetition, by being 
mistaken and correcting her errors’ 
(Rancière 2009 [2008]: 8-9). Hundert, 
perhaps to his chagrin, and more 
certainly to ours, never learned this 
lesson. Hundert’s character as a 
knowledgeable schoolmaster is, in this 
regard, his fate. He remains the Old 
Pedagogue, and therefore remains 
ignorant of how to teach his students   
the conditions for their own             
intellectual – and moral – emancipation.
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